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I. Introduction 
The emergence of vigilante force of 
the Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta (the 
Islamic Youth Front of Surakarta, FPIS)1 in 
Solo is a not single phenomenon in 
Indonesia. Along with its emergence due to 
inter-religious conflict in Ambon in the early 
1999, there are some other Islamic 
organizations either in Solo or in Indonesia in 
general. As a local Islamic vigilante force, 
however, the FPIS is not only concern with 
local issues in Solo but also involved much in 
some national issues. Although the 
organization was not much involved in 
Ambon conflict as the Laskar Jihād of Forum 
Komunikasi Ahlu al-Sunnah wa al-Jama‘ah 
(FKAWJ), its existence in Solo and Indonesia 
in general is quite significant. Flock of people 
on the streets protesting some government’s 
policies as well as ‘sweeping’ of cafes and 
Westerners in Solo are among the activities 
of this group. The existence of the FPIS in 
Solo, in fact, adds the peculiarities of the city 
in which some radical Islamic movements 
arise. Some Islamic vigilante forces also 
                                                 
1 Not to be misunderstood with the Front Pembela 
Islam (Islamic Defender Front, FPI) of Habieb Rizieq. 
The FPIS has nothing to do with the FPI, although the 
emerged in many other cities in Indonesia but 
they ard not as much as happened in Solo. 
Eventually, based on its activities, the FPIS 
could be classified as radical in many 
respects.  
 The FPIS was initially an inclusive 
organization which was intended as an 
umbrella for some Islamic organizations in 
Solo. Currently, the organization has become 
an exclusive organization for a certain 
Muslim group. The ‘acquisition’ of the FPIS 
by Gumuk mosque community or well 
known as jama‘ah Gumuk are among the 
interesting points of the FPIS. The strong 
allegiance of the jama‘ah to Islamic ideology 
and the networks of the jama‘ah that is 
widely spread not only in Solo but across ex-
residency of Surakarta has made the FPIS as 
a powerful Islamic activism. Currently, the 
FPIS is a mean of actions for an anonymous 
of Gumuk mosque community, which from 
some of its features could be categorized as 
salafy. Interestingly enough, the jama‘ah 
Gumuk which was initially concern with 
Islamic teachings has shifted to concern with 
FPI has also its branch in Solo. Many times, some 
journalists and even academicians wrongly wrote the 
FPIS as Front Pembela Islam Surakarta. 
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political issues through the FPIS. Different 
from other Islamic activism in Yogyakarta 
for instance which is dominated by student 
organizations, in the Solo context the FPIS is 
among the number Islamic vigilante forces 
for common people which eagerly protest 
and oppose to government regulations. 
Finally, since the existence of the FPIS and 
the jama‘ah Gumuk could not be separated, 
the discussion the organization could not also 
be separated from a broad exploration of the 
jama‘ah. By exploring the FPIS hopefully 
would reveal many questions not only about 
the organization, but my basic question why 
such Islamic radical movements are 
flourishing in Solo. Finally, this exploration 
would lead to some recommendation for the 
authorities that to some extend would reduce 
the phenomena of Islamic radical activisms 
in Solo.  
 
II. Research Method 
The method used in this research is 
descriptive method. Research with 
descriptive methods aims to describe 
precisely the characteristics of an individual, 
condition, symptom, or certain group or to 
determine the frequency or spread of a 
symptom or frequency of a certain 
relationship between other symptoms in 
society (De Vaus, 2013). 
The source of data in this study 
consists of two sources, namely primary data 
sources and secondary data sources. Primary 
data is data obtained directly from the source; 
observed and recorded for the first time. The 
data becomes secondary data if it is used by 
people who are not directly related to the 
research concerned. Secondary data is data 
that is not attempted to collect itself by 
researchers, for example from the Bureau of 
statistics, magazines, information or other 
public (Palinkas, L. A. et.al., 2015). 
According to Corbin, J. et.al. (2014) primary 
data is data that can be obtained directly from 
                                                 
2 On the Hijriyah (lunar) calendar it was on 18 
Syawwal 1419. 
the field or place of research. The primary 
source of this research was taken from 
interviews and observations with related 
parties. 
III. Research Findings and Discussion 
 Socio-political conduciveness was 
among other things that made the 
establishment of the FPIS is possible. 
Although the trigger of its establishment was 
the Muslims-Christians conflict in Ambon in 
1999, the foundation of the FPIS was due 
mostly to the opening of the political access 
after the downfall of Suharto regime. In fact, 
many other inter-religious conflicts were also 
happened in some Muslims’ world during the 
New Order which given rise to the angers of 
Muslims in Indonesia. Other religious issues 
in Indonesia were also happened during this 
period such as the Tanjung Priok massacre 
and Aceh conflict, but did not lead to the 
emergence of such Islamic vigilante forces. 
Other local social problems due to the harsh 
politics of the government could not also 
bring about the rise of such religious vigilante 
forces. Indeed, such Islamic activism was 
absolutely not possible during that era. The 
dramatic political changes of Indonesia in 
1998 have shifted many things on social as 
well as political level.  
 The FPIS was officially declared on 5 
February 19992 in Solo during a huge 
Muslims’ demonstration on the issue of the 
killing of some Muslims in Ambon in 
January 1999. The founders of the FPIS are 
M. Kalono, M. Sadali, Umar Baradja, M. 
Taufiq, Ahmad Abu Yazid, and Dwi 
Wuryanto who have made a series of 
meetings prior to the declaration of the 
organization. In fact, the seed of the 
organization had been initiated earlier in 
November 1998, i.e., the establishment of 
Kesatuan Komando Pemuda Islam (the 
Command Union of Muslim Youth, KKPI) 
by Kalono and Yazid. In the same way, the 
organization was established during the Apel 
Siaga Umat Islam (Muslims’ call for 
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readiness) of about 7,000 Muslims gathered 
at the Lapangan Kota Barat Solo which was 
organized by Forum Komunikasi Umat Islam 
Surakarta (Communication Forum for 
Muslims in Surakarta, FORKUIS). M. 
Kalono, the co-founder and the first leader of 
FPIS, asserts that the participants of the Apel 
Siaga sang a song of jihād to arouse their own 
spirit of Islam which he called as nuqhtah al-
inthilāq (the turning point) for Indonesian 
Muslims. The KKPI was intended to be such 
kind of a task force of the FORKUIS, an 
umbrella for many Islamic organizations in 
Solo, and ex-residency of Surakarta in 
general. The KKPI, however, did not receive 
massive response from Muslims in Solo until 
the inter-religious conflict in Ambon which 
led to the establishment of the FPIS, to 
substitute the existence of the KKPI. Besides, 
as Kalono argues that the substitution of the 
FPIS to KKPI was also due to the frontal 
attitude of the organization toward the 
government. The renaming of the earlier 
Islamic organization was finally taken to 
broaden the scope area for the FPIS and also 
intended to attract more enthusiastic of 
Muslim youths in Surakarta. At the same 
time on 5 February 1999, the FORKUIS was 
also renamed as FKUIS and still as an 
umbrella for most Islamic organizations in 
Surakarta.3 
 On the establishment of the FPIS, the 
most active leader of FPIS Warsito Adnan 
states that this organization emerged based 
on at least three reasons: (1) the massacre of 
Muslims and their confrontation with 
Christians in Ambon, (2) international hidden 
scenario on Muslims, and (3) unfair 
Christianization mission in Indonesia 
(Fananie et al. 2002). Further he elaborates 
the second reason that the United States of 
America has a hidden agenda on Indonesian 
Muslims as their aggressive opposition to US 
in many of its agendas in Indonesia. Warsito 
also acknowledges that indeed in Solo 
                                                 
3 Interview with M. Kalono in Solo on 12, 13 
September 2006. 
4 Endang Turmudi & Riza Sihbudi (eds), Islam dan 
Radikalisme di Indonesia. Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2005. 
emerge many anti-US-policy protests 
especially its interference in some Muslim 
countries such as in Afghanistan, Iraq etc. In 
addition to its confrontation with US, the 
FPIS rejects not only the presence of 
Westerners in Solo but also Western goods 
and values. Therefore, besides sweeping 
Western tourists in Solo, the FPIS also rejects 
any goods such as Sprite and Coca-Cola, and 
also refuses some Western values such as 
pluralism and democracy.4 Kalono 
acknowledges that it was him who initially 
led the FPIS to use swords in their actions 
especially in raiding some cafes and hotels 
during Ramadlan in Solo. For him such 
attitude is necessary to show the power of 
Islam and to ‘force’ them to respect Muslims 
during the fasting month. 5 
 Although the Ambon inter-religious 
conflict had induced the emergence to the 
FPIS, the organization was not much 
involved the conflict. Its concern with 
Ambonese Muslims was exposed by giving 
logistics and medical assistance, beside the 
involvement of some activists of the FPIS in 
the Laskar Jihād. Instead, it was active in 
promoting to the public the necessity of 
Muslims’ unity to address some Muslims’ 
problems such as the case of Ambon and also 
some other international issues. Therefore, 
the FPIS was engaged in collecting Muslims’ 
financial assistance to help Muslims who 
need it and consistently contesting injustice 
and despotism toward Muslims. Almost all 
the FPIS activities are in line with the general 
purpose of this organization i.e. to be in the 
front in assisting Muslims having such 
troubles as in Ambon. In addition, the unfair 
arrestment of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Ja’far 
Umar Thalib of Laskar Jihād were also the 
concern of the FPIS.6 It is obvious that 
although the FPIS is different from many any 
other Islamic organizations in many 
perspectives, sometimes the FPIS shared 
many common things with other Islamic 
5 Interview with M. Kalono in Solo on 12, 13 
September 2006. 
6 Gatra, 17 May 2002. 
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organizations and ‘hand-in-hand’ in 
conducting some activities. Cholid Hasan, 
the leader of the board members of the FPIS, 
even asserts that the organization was not 
merely concern with religious issues, but in 
many cases it also concern with social issues 
such as the tsunami in Aceh in 1994 and also 
the earthquake in Yogyakarta and Klaten, 
Central Java in 1996.7 
 Relatively similar to its counterpart 
Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender 
Front, FPI) in Jakarta, the FPIS also concerns 
much with maintaining a conducive 
atmosphere for Muslims society. 
Undeniably, therefore, many times the FPIS 
forbid some entertainment places such as 
cafés and discotheques to open during fasting 
month. For the FPIS, these places not only 
would endanger Muslim community but 
reduce the concentration of Muslims in doing 
their fasting during Ramadlan. For them, the 
problem is because there are many immoral 
things which violate God’s law (ma‘siyah) in 
these places.  Some activists of the FPIS 
assert that the government law is quite clear, 
and that they have given their tolerance about 
other eleven months to run their businesses. 
The FPIS, however, would not act anything 
to such places unless the local authorities do 
something to enforce the law. As part of the 
Solonese, the FPIS activists fully understand 
that night life is part of Solo culture. 
Therefore, as far as the places do not facilitate 
people to do sin things, the FPIS would not 
interfere them.8 Among the most FPIS’ 
concern on the local level was the case of the 
priest Ahmad Welson. The mocking of the 
priest Welson on the prophet Muhammad on 
PTPN Rasitania radio broadcaster 
programme in 2000 was fiercely reacted by 
the FPIS which ended to the confiscation of 
some broadcaster instruments and the 
detention of the priest.9 Both Surakarta and 
                                                 
7 Interview with the Cholid Hassan, the board 
legislative leader of the FPIS, in Solo on 22 June 2006. 
8 Suara Merdeka, 1 November 2002. 
9 The priest is a new convert from Islam to 
Christianity. During his live talk show in the 
broadcasting, he said that before becoming a Muslim, 
Muhammad was a Christian.  
Semarang courts finally sentenced the priest 
five years in jail, although nowadays he is 
waiting for his appeal his case to the Supreme 
Court.10 From the activities of the FPIS, it is 
quite similar with the FPI of Habib Rizieq 
Syihab in Jakarta. The similarities, however, 
do not sign their organizational link except 
that they have common responsibilities 
towards Muslims in Indonesia.  
 In general, the FPIS concerns much 
with Muslims problems, especially those 
happened in Solo. The inability of local 
authorities to handle social problems in Solo 
has induced the participation of the FPIS to 
address them. At the same time, the social 
problems are among the reasons of the FPIS 
the necessity of the government to employ 
sharī‘ah. Among the problems in which the 
FPIS took part is the regulation issued by the 
local department of education to ban students 
to put their veiled photos in their senior high 
school certificates. The FPIS was also 
fiercely opposed the erotic dances and 
women tattoo contest held by Pall Mall in a 
hotel in Solo in 2000. The organization even 
charged the organizer to the lawsuit. In many 
cases, along with some other Laskar Islam 
(vigilante forces) the FPIS pressed on the 
police officers to officially ban and raid 
several centres of gambling in Solo. The most 
courageous attitude of the FPIS was the flock 
and violence attitude of thousand devout 
followers of the PDI in the main streets in 
Solo after the lost of Megawati at the general 
election in 1999. The police forces and any 
other Islamic forces could do nothing in this 
occurrence until the about 300 people of the 
FPIS who valiantly dismiss the flocks by 
reciting Allahu Akbar (Allah the great) while 
holding swords in their hands.11 The 
powerful actions of the FPIS especially 
during the leadership of Warsito Adnan along 
with some other laskars in Solo gained much 
10 The most controversial Muslim figure in Solo, 
Mudrick M. Sangidoe together with the FPIS support 
them in almost every trial in the court. Solopos, 4 
Maret 2000. 
11 Interview with Cholid Hasan in Solo on 11 
August 2006; Interview with Ali Usman, a Muslim 
figure in Solo, in Solo, on 13 September 2006. 
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support and empathy from Muslims in Solo. 
For some other communities, on the other 
hand, these forces to some degree have 
caused their fear. In many cases, the 
authorities or any other groups used such 
these paramilitary forces to have their own 
interests or any laskar themselves who had 
the benefits. 
FPIS is not only concern much with 
local issues in Solo, but also national as well 
as international issues. On these issues, as a 
regional-base organization, it did not only 
perform its actions in Solo, but also in Jakarta 
along with some other national Islamic 
organizations. On national issues, the FPIS 
took its major role in opposing the 
government regulations in the form of 
demonstrations in Solo as well as in Jakarta 
such as on the issue of Jakarta Charter, the 
Korupsi, Kolusi, & Nepotisme (corruption, 
collusion and nepotism, KKN), the endless 
case of Tanjung Priok massacre, the IMF 
financial aid, the escalation of BBM prices in 
2002, the arrestment of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 
by force in 2002, and also the presence of 
George Bush in Jakarta in 2006. Meanwhile, 
on some international issues, the FPIS was 
enthusiastically opposed the invasion of 
Israel to Palestine, the US invasion to 
Afghanistan (2001), the invasion of the US to 
Iraq (2003), the Israel invasion to Lebanon 
(2006), etc. In general, the FPIS is the leading 
Islamic organizations in Solo in opposing the 
government’s regulations as well as in 
‘helping’ local authorities to implement the 
existing laws. On the issues at the national 
level, the FPIS was hand-in-hand with some 
other Islamic organizations such as the FPI 
and Laskar Jihād of Jakarta before the latter 
was banned. Undeniably, therefore, in 
several cases the involvement of the FPIS in 
some actions in Jakarta ended with the 
arrestment of some of its activists. 
  FPIS’ main concerns are to assist any 
Muslims in need of its support and oppose 
injustice and despotism of the government. 
From the above activities of the FPIS, it is 
obvious that it still use the bureaucratic 
mechanism to voice out their political 
aspirations. The former leader of the FPIS, 
Warsito Adnan, and the spiritual leader of the 
FPIS, Mudzakir, acknowledge that the FPIS 
would never employ violence in their actions 
except in term of self-defence. Even more, 
although in many of its actions along with 
some other Islamic organizations in the 
streets of Solo seems ferocious, in fact these 
activities would never led them to such 
violence. As Warsito argues, the FPIS is 
trying to help the authorities to enforce the 
law and make this enforcement is possible. 
On some endless social problems in Solo and 
on the national level, the FPIS is trying to 
convince the government on the necessity of 
Islamic sharī‘ah to address all the social 
problems. Therefore, it would continuously 
demand the implementation of Islamic 
sharī‘ah on both local and national levels by 
necessarily means as long as do not 
contradict with the positive laws. 
On the establishment of the FPIS, 
Muslims in Solo in general and some Islamic 
organizations in particular responded 
positively. The great support of the Solonese 
Muslims to the organization was not only 
such a euphoria of the new atmosphere of 
politics, but it also the necessity of the society 
to the existence of such Islamic activism. The 
long-standing opposition of Indonesian 
Muslims during the New Order and the 
widely spread of problems within the society 
had brought about the longing of the 
Solonese Muslims to such powerful Islamic 
organization. Since there were many interests 
within the FPIS, the Gumuk mosque 
community ‘took over’ the organization. The 
‘acquisition’ of the FPIS by the group was 
necessary not only to keep the organization 
on its track but to maintain the sustainability 
of the organization. Eventually, the turning of 
the Jama‘ah Gumuk to political aspects by 
the ‘acquisition’ of the FPIS is interesting 
phenomenon. 
The great response of Muslims in 
Solo was followed by fundamental changes 
within the FPIS. Several months afterwards, 
the FPIS, which was initially intended to be 
such an umbrella institution for some Islamic 
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organizations in Surakarta was finally took 
over by the jama‘ah Gumuk. Kalono who 
acted as the coordinator of the FPIS was 
finally replaced by Thoharudin who act as the 
leader of the FPIS as requested by Mudzakir, 
the spiritual leader of the Gumuk mosque 
community. The assignment of Thoharudin 
as the leader was intentionally taken by some 
of its founders to have the organization under 
the control of Gumuk mosque community 
which was led by Mudzakir. 
Mudazkir himself argues that                           
the ‘acquisition’ was finally completed due to 
the fact that many times the FPIS had been 
used by certain Muslim groups to have their 
own interests which was out of the track of 
the organization.12 Thoharudin who only 
served for several months as the leader of the 
FPIS due to his duty to go to Ambon was 
replaced by Warsito Adnan afterwards. Since 
the leadership of Thoharudin, almost all the 
organizational meetings of the FPIS were 
held in Gumuk mosque which was of course 
attended mostly by the mosque community. 
The ten people serve as the legislative board 
members are Cholid Hasan of the Gumuk 
who act as the leader and followed by M. 
Taufiq, Agus Setiawan, Mudzakir, 
Wahyuddin, M. Sholeh, Umar Baradja, M. 
Sadali, and Abu Yazid. Although the board 
members are from many different groups of 
Muslims in Solo, Cholid Hasan and 
Mudzakir are the most powerful people to the 
organization. The ‘acquisition’ of the FPIS 
by Gumuk mosque community brought about 
some disappointment of people which finally 
invoked the rise of some other similar 
vigilante forces in the region. 
 Under the leadership of Warsito 
Adnan (2000-2005), the FPIS had become a 
leading Islamic organization in Solo which 
also well known at the national level. 
                                                 
12 Interview with Mudzakir, the spiritual leader of 
jama‘ah Gumuk, in Solo on 17 November 2006. 
13 Interview with M. Kalono in Solo on 13 
September 2006. 
14 In Islamic history, the term Hawariyyun is used 
to refer to the disciple of the prophet Isa, the devout 
follower of Isa, the helper of Allah. From this account, 
Although, initially the ‘acquisition’ was 
merely intended to save the organization 
from any personal or group’s interests, finally 
the Jama‘ah Gumuk fully employ this 
organization as its mean to permeate Islamic 
sharī‘ah and also some other Muslims' 
issues. Eventually, while the organization is 
consistently caring on Muslims' issues, the 
leaders of the Jama‘ah Gumuk, Mudzakir 
and Cholid Hasan play a significant role as 
the ideologues of the organization. Finally, 
although none of the Jama‘ah Gumuk 
members co-founded of the organization, 
nowadays the FPIS and the Gumuk 
community are hardly possible to distinguish. 
Kalano, however, asserts that the Gumuks 
have been using the FPIS for their own 
interests since it was already well known at 
that time of the ‘acquisition”.13 The FPIS 
leader after Warsito, i.e., Umar Kasim (2005-
2010) is not quite significant phenomena as it 
used to be. It could be noted, that although the 
FPIS is still involved in some actions in Solo, 
its appearance is not as leading as it used to. 
The significant changes of the political 
attitudes of the FPIS on both local and 
national level reflected the changes of the 
mainstream within the Gumuks. Soon after 
the ‘acquisition’ of the FPIS, the Gumuks 
established a similar vigilante force namely 
Hawariyyun (the disciples)14 as the inner 
circle of the FPIS having special duty to 
guard the security the Gumuk mosque and its 
surrounding.15 The FPIS’ power and 
successful actions has influenced the bargain 
position of Muslims in Solo in particular, and 
in Indonesia in general. 
 The successful of the FPIS under the 
leadership of Warsito could not be separated 
from the Gumuk community. Initially, as an 
umbrella organization the FPIS was using 
some many network to gather its participants. 
After the taking over by Gumuk community, 
the word Hawariyyun could also means as the 
defender of Allah. 
15 Currently, however, the Hawariyyun is involved 
in most activities of the FPIS, including the 
demonstrations. It seems that the decline of the FPIS 
is deliberately on purpose of the Gumuks in its efforts 
to develop the Hawariyyun. 
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the members of the organization are 
exclusively for Gumuk members. The broad 
network of the Gumuk not only across Solo 
but Surakarta has escalated the members of 
the organization. Therefore, Warsito claims 
that the FPIS members could reach as many 
as 12,000 people. The peak of the FPIS was 
in 2002 when it acted in more than 78 actions 
locally or nationally.16 In conjunction with 
the activities of the FPIS, the vigilante force 
organizes some training on war strategies to 
train its members. Once this organization 
held such paramilitary training during the 
daylight in Klaten, it was banned by the 
authorities on the accusation that the activity 
would incite such social unrest.  
 Although in many respects the FPIS’ 
activities have declined, it is still a powerful 
Islamic organization in Solo. With the 
resources of the Gumuk community, the FPIS 
is such an alert huge power in Solo. The 
Gumuk community especially under the 
spiritual leader of Mudzakir had played an 
important role in saving the organization 
from both unnecessarily usage and also the 
vanishing of the organization. As indicated 
by the co-founder Kalono that an Islamic 
organization is necessary for a certain 
situation. For him the FPIS’ initial task has 
completed i.e., to raise the dignity of 
Muslims; the flourish of some similar Islamic 
organizations (vigilante forces) in Solo is one 
of the successful task of the FPIS. On the 
other hand, the Gumuk community has seen 
the FPIS as their mean to voice out their 
political aspirations. Since its establishment 
in early 1970s, it is the first time for the 
Gumuk community to utterly speak out their 
demand to balance their main activities, i.e., 
studying pure Islam. Therefore, to know 
further about the inside and future of the 
FPIS, it is necessary to look closer to the 
existence of the Gumuk mosque community. 
 
The Jama‘ah of Gumuk 
                                                 
16 Solopos, 4 October 2002. 
Since the FPIS is closely associated 
with the jama‘ah of Gumuk mosque, it is 
interesting to see further about this 
community. Located in a village of Gumuk, 
the mosque and its activities are controlled by 
an anonymous huge jama‘ah conducting 
daily intensive religious teachings. It was in 
the mid 1970s that Ustadz Mudzakir initiated 
his activities in the mosque by conducting 
informal religious teachings. His activities 
have attracted more and more people from 
many different parts of Solo to study Islam 
with him. Nowadays, the membership and 
networks of the jama‘ah could reach not only 
across Solo, but some other regions in the ex-
residency of Surakarta. Different from other 
mosques’ jama‘ah in general, the members of 
the group have a great commitment and 
loyalty toward the jama‘ah, let alone its 
leader. Therefore, one of its figures, Cholid 
Hasan tends to refer his jama‘ah as a solid 
mass. Although the Islamic teachings of this 
group basically are not different much from 
those of modern Islamic organizations the 
organization tends to be quite exclusive 
organization. Therefore, the exclusiveness of 
this jama‘ah is becoming one of its great 
characteristics.  
 The jama‘ah Gumuk tends to be 
closed and an exclusive group. First, this 
group does not have any formal names as any 
other Islamic groups or organizations. 
Similar to salafy,  Cholid Hasan argues that 
to name as a formal organization would only 
add another split within Islam (hizbiyah). 
Second, the community is also characterized 
by the Gumuk mosque which is different 
from any common mosques in general. The 
mosque building is more like four-storey 
house rather than a mosque. In this case, 
however, Warsito Adnan argues that initially 
the mosque was just the same as other 
mosque. Due to the need of some more rooms 
for Islamic activities and the unavailability of 
spaces, the jama‘ah built a four-storey 
building and use two of its storey as a 
mosque, namely Al-Abrār. After being 
rebuilt, however, the name was not common 
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anymore among the nearby community. 
Third, most of the activists of the mosque are 
not coming from the nearby mosque but from 
many different districts in Solo. As far as the 
members of the jama‘ah are concerned, most 
of them are from the periphery and rural areas 
of Solo. This phenomenon leads me to 
assume that they are from a certain 
community level in Solo. Forth, although the 
mosque holds an Islamic teaching every 
morning which is opened for any participants 
or common members, this community has 
other intensive Islamic teachings for the inner 
circle of this community. It is from the core 
of this community that many activities done 
by the FPIS and Hawariyyun come to the 
decision. Finally, the distinctiveness of the 
jama‘ah could be seen from the appearance 
of its members which is more like salafy 
followers rather than moderate one. In 
general, from their outlook people could 
identify them not as moderate one. Some of 
the characteristics of their salafy are that they 
grow their beards and believe that isbāl, 
wearing garments that hang below the ankles, 
is prohibited (haram), although the women of 
this group do not wear head-to-toe coverage, 
but only regular hijāb.  
Although the mosque of Gumuk is in 
the centre of the city, most of its members are 
not from its surrounding. Most members of 
the Gumuk are lower class abangan society 
from the periphery of Solo. In term of 
educational level of its members, only a few 
of them have attended higher education. The 
simple Islamic teachings of the community 
which focus more on daily life and morality 
have attracted more people to join to this 
group. Moreover, the intensive interactions 
within their own communities composed 
such kind of solid membership. In my view, 
the role of its charismatic leader KH. 
Mudzakir also played a significant role in 
fastening the solidarity and ties between its 
members. As I stated somewhere above that 
the mosque lecturing activities which began 
since mid 70s has create a solid community. 
This community, after all, is easily mobilized 
into a certain direction according to the 
principles they learned so far. They way how 
the elites of the group frame some issues with 
Islamic terms is central to the loyalty and 
solidarity among its members. However, 
since the members of the community vary 
from many different ages and backgrounds, 
the community is quite ‘rich’ in term of its 
resources. 
 
The Dissemination of Radical Spirits 
Unlike the Pondok Ngruki, the 
dissemination of radical spirit within the 
jama‘ah Gumuk  tends to be more open for 
its members. This is due also to the fact that 
the Islamic activism within the Pondok 
Ngruki tends to be clandestine, rather than 
the Gumuks which has no such clandestine 
haraki (Islamic activism). Although the 
jama‘ah has such an inner circle, the radical 
spirit is openly embedded during the daily 
Islamic teachings (pengajian). The teachings 
which mostly deal with Alquran and Hadith 
are full of interpretations concerning to 
current social and political situation in 
Indonesia as well as in other Muslim 
countries. The way how some senior leaders 
of this jama‘ah frame social and political 
issues with Islamic terms has formed such 
radical Islamists. Different from other salafy-
oriented communities, some Islamic concepts 
on politics are also widely discussed by this 
community. In addition, anti-Western 
countries especially the US are also among 
interesting topics for their Islamic teaching 
sessions. 
 Almost similar to any other social 
movements, the jama‘ah Gumuk has several 
methods in disseminating its ideas to its 
members. Such general lecture on Islamic 
studies (majlis taklim) is the most common 
method in the Gumuk mosque for general 
members. The inner circle of the Gumuks 
members are those having high loyalty to the 
leaders and it is distinguished by vow an oath 
of loyalty (bai‘at). According to their term, 
those vowed an oath to the leader would be 
considered as the member of the real 
‘jama‘ah’. Similar to tarbiyah method 
employed by Islamic youth movement (it 
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used to be named as usrah and halaqah 
respectively), the Gumuk also employ such 
kind of cell system to broaden its network. 
Based on the majlis taklim held everyday. I 
will describe below some important themesin 
which some leaders of the community frame 
its ideas.  
 Politics is among the most significant 
feature of the themes. In fact, the jama‘ah 
studies Alquran and Hadith exegesis as its 
main entrance. Some leaders, especially 
Mudazkir, always refer to current politics to 
broaden their description. Similar to some 
other radical Islamist generally, they reject 
the Pancasila as the ideology of the state, 
even more as the sole ideological foundation 
(asas tunggal). Since they refuse to join to 
any political parties, even the Islamic ones, 
they consider politics as strictly prohibited 
(harām). Undeniably, although it is not 
required by the leaders, it is understood that 
all the members of the Gumuk are abstain 
(golput)17 on the general election. Further, on 
a certain occasion they assert that Indonesian 
government is not only illegitimate 
government, but it is a wrong system of the 
state. For them, to acknowledge the existence 
of Indonesian government as a legitimate 
system of the state is haram, even to be 
involved in the system to endeavour for 
Islam. Interestingly enough, however, the 
Gumuks consider that Islamic State is not 
necessary yet to reinforce Islamic law 
(sharī‘ah). Therefore, Islamic State and 
Khilāfah Islamiyah are quite rare themes of 
their discussion.  
 Conversely, the Gumuks believe that 
sharī‘ah is much more important to achieve 
ummah (Islamic society). For them, it was 
sharī‘ah that would lead Indonesia to be 
blessed by God which, finally, would lead to 
the prosperity of the society. Along with 
establishment of the MMI in 2000, the 
jama‘ah Gumuk also enthusiastically 
pronounce the necessity of sharī‘ah. Is also 
argues that the fear of many people that 
sharī‘ah would lead to the disintegration of 
                                                 
 
the country is one of the Western propaganda 
to destroy Islam.18 As the discourse of 
sharī‘ah in the community is not as much as 
that of in the Pondok Ngruki or in the Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), the Gumuk do 
not elaborate much on this issue. Eventually, 
the discourse on the issue remains on the 
discourse level and never reached a clear 
concept of sharī‘ah or the way how to 
achieve it. Mudazkir, however, 
acknowledges that the effort of the MMI to 
socialize the concept is successful enough, 
although the way how the MMI achieved it is 
too vulgar. At least, currently the society is 
quite familiar with the issue and does not 
consider it as taboo. In the same way, due to 
the efforts of some Islamic organizations 
including the MMI, the government is also 
familiar with the issue especially at the local 
level. Undeniably, therefore, that many 
Islamic organizations in many different 
regions demanded Peraturan Daerah on 
sharī‘ah (regional regulation on sharī‘ah or 
Perda sharī‘ah). In this respect, however, the 
Gumuk does not put the agenda of 
implementing sharī‘ah as its major activities. 
As far as I am concerned, the Gumuk 
community has its own agenda dealing with 
this central issue.  
For the jama‘ah  Gumuk, however, 
the regional regulation of sharī‘ah which 
have been passed in some regions is not good 
for Islam ideologically, although politically it 
has some significance. For this reason, the 
jama‘ah does not enthusiastically propose 
Peraturan Daerah (regional regulation, 
Perda) sharī‘ah for the local government of 
Solo. In this regards, Chalid Hasan stresses 
the readiness of the society to accept sharī‘ah 
is very urgent. Further he elaborates that 
Muslims should learn much from the case of 
Acehnese, which was not ready yet to 
implement sharī‘ah. Therefore, it is the task 
of some Islamic organizations to re-Islamize 
the grassroots in order to accept sharī‘ah as 
part of the wholeness of Islam. Later on when 
the society is ready, it would not be difficult 
for Muslims not only to propose the regional 
18 Suara Front, No. 43, I, 30 March-5 April 2001. 
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regulation of sharī‘ah, but also to impose it 
into the society.19 Therefore, the escalating 
demand of Muslims in many parts of 
Indonesia to the regional regulation of 
sharī‘ah is not responded positively by the 
Gumuks. Indeed, Mudzakir asserts that those 
regional regulation on sharī‘ah is good 
politically, but not ideologically since 
Muslims still under the non-Muslims system 
of the state.20 Rather, Mudzakir asserts that 
sharī‘ah should be implemented from the 
smallest system of society, a family or 
school.21 For this reason, the Gumuk 
established an elementary school based on 
sharī‘ah, i.e., Sekolah Dasar Islam Al-
Fattah, Sekolah Berbasis Sharī‘ah in 2003 
which is not exclusively for the Gumuks but 
also openly for general people.22 
Unlike in the Pondok Ngruki, jihād is 
not broadly discussed in the Gumuk 
community. While the Ngrukis tend to say 
that jihād should be interpreted more in term 
of fights, the Gumuks, as asserted by Chalid, 
believe that this term has much broader 
interpretation rather than just fights and wars, 
although the latter one should not be  
neglected. In the same way, some radical 
Islamism’s interpretation on jihād more in 
term of violence is not well accepted by this 
community. On this issue, Chalid asserts that 
Islamic endeavour through violence would 
not give much benefits for Islam, but the 
other way around. He believes that the 
Prophet Muhammad himself did not require 
the existence of an Islamic State for the 
implementation of sharī‘ah. For him, 
therefore, violence would be the last choice if 
the implementation  
                                                 
19 Interview with Chalid Hasan in Solo on 9 
November 2006. 
20  Conversation with Mudzakir in Yogyakarta on 
21 February 2007. 
21 In this case, Mudzakir quotes one of the 
principles of the maxims of Islamic jurisprudence 
mālā yudraku kulluhu lā yudraku kulluhu (what cannot 
be accomplished in its whole, cannot be left in its 
whole). Interview with Mudzakir in Solo on 17 Nov 
2006. See also Suara Front, No. 01/II/29 June 2001, 
p.3. 
On the case of Bali bombings, 
however, Chalid regretted this attitude 
although he could understand why some 
people were involved in such radical 
violence. He concludes that violence could be 
necessary in a certain condition in which 
Muslims should do so. On the other hand, the 
Gumuks believe such violence as in Ambon 
and Poso is completely different from that 
one in Bali. On an occasion Mudazkir asserts 
that the Ambon and Poso wars are happened 
due mostly to the inability of the government 
to handle social problems in those regions 
properly. Similarly, the Gumuks believe that 
economic problems faced by Indonesians 
since the downfall of Suharto regime is due 
to the ignorance of the government to Islam 
as a social as well as political systems. 
However, the Gumuk does not agree at all to 
the label of terrorism which is embedded to 
some radical Islamists in Indonesia.  
Relatively similar to many other 
radical Islamists’, the Gumuks consider the 
West as part of current problems of Muslims. 
The hegemony of the West as represented by 
the globalization and modernization in many 
aspects of life has been regarded as a threat. 
The West, especially, the United Stated is 
considered as the great enemy since the Jews, 
as the latent enemy of Islam, is behind all the 
US’ interests. Democracy and pluralism as 
part of Western culture and civilization are 
considered by the community as harām since 
they violate the God’s law. To employ 
democracy as a state system could be 
considered as mixing the truth (truth) and the 
falsehood (democracy).23 The Gumuks 
simply argue that democracy would not 
reduce any immoral things (maksiyat) in 
22 Although the Islamic elementary school just 
been established several years ago (2003), it has many 
students since its beginning. The establishment of this 
school was supported by the jama‘ah Gumuk, i.e., by 
moving all the jama‘ah’s children at other elementary 
schools to this newly founded school.  
23 Their conviction is based on Alquran verse 42 of 
Al-Baqarah saying “wa lā talbisu al-haq bi al-bātil wa 
taktumu al-haq wa antum ta‘lamūn” (And cover not 
Truth with falsehood, nor conceal the Truth when ye 
know). Interview with Mudzakir in Solo on 17 Nov 
2006. 
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society as they are even widely spread in the 
Western countries.24 Simply, rather than 
democracy, Islam has much more perfect 
political system, i.e., syūrā.25 For them Islam 
is more than just a religion but a way of life 
which not only would organize the 
relationship between human being and God, 
but also between human being with others. 
Their conviction that sharī‘ah could solve 
any worldly problems is unquestionable.  
All the above issues are often 
discussed among with especially during the 
session of Islamic teachings. Their belief that 
Jews are behind all agendas of the US add 
their hatred to almost all Western countries, 
especially those opposed to Muslims. 
Therefore, the jama‘ah Gumuk through the 
FPIS harshly protested the idea of the 
president of Abdurrahman Wahid when he 
wanted to establish a trade between Indonesia 
and the Israel. Similarly, the Gumuk also 
demanded the government to quit from 
program held by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) since it had many hidden 
agendas to weaken Muslims countries. 26 
Their hatred to the US is represented not only 
by burning of the US national flag but also by 
boycotting all goods having to do with the 
West. In addition, the issue of terrorism 
firstly coined by the US is countered by 
accusing the US as the real terrorist, 
especially the US and its ally’s annexation to 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Eventually, the issue of 
anti-West is among the most fruitful frames 
beside sharī‘ah for common Muslims in Solo 
in particular and Indonesia in general. On this 
respect, however, Mudzakir asserts that the 
Gumuk will not oppose to the US and its 
allies as long as they do not violate Islam or 
Muslims.  
                                                 
24 Suara Front, No. 31, I, 15-21 December 2000. 
25 The notion of shūra (consultation) is different 
from democracy. However, many people consider that 
shūra is the concept of democracy within Islam. 
Unlike democracy in which supreme authority is at the 
hand of people or through their representatives, shūra 
is a concept in which supreme authority is at the hand 
of Allah (God) through a rational mechanism of 
human being. In other word, the notion of shūra is 
 Conclusively, the unity of ummah is 
the main and ultimate agenda of the Gumuk. 
All the above discourse construction is meant 
to get the support from the society as a way 
to unite all Muslims. The notion of unity of 
ummah appears as the slogan of the FPIS, the 
socio-political mean of the Gumuk. Written 
down in many forms and in many occasion, 
the slogan of ‘Islam bersatu tak bisa 
dikalahkan’ (United Muslims could not be 
defeated) is the main slogan to attract and 
agitate people in the streets. As also asserted 
many times by the Gumuk leaders such as 
Mudzakir and Chalid that the unity of 
Muslim is very urgent to achieve the victory 
of Islam. Muslims could be easily made of 
fool by their enemies because nowadays 
Muslims are weak. One of the weaknesses of 
Muslims is that it is split in many different 
Islamic organizations which, in turn, has its 
own different purposes. To reach the unity of 
Muslims, therefore, Mudzakir argues that the 
Gumuk community does not consider 
themselves as an Islamic organization. He 
believes that Islamic organizations and 
parties would not unite Muslims, but split 
them.27 
 Based on the same reason, the 
Gumuks believe that Islam does not 
recognize the existence of some madzhabs 
(Islamic schools). Mudzakir argues that the 
existence of such madzhabs such as Shafi’ite 
or Hanafite would only split the unity of 
Muslims. He believes that the only madzhab 
in Islam is the salafy, i.e., the generation of 
the Prophet, its companions and two 
generations after them. Other new Islamic 
school of thoughts such as Hambalite is not 
an authentic interpretation of Islam. 
Therefore, Muslims not only should study 
Islam as studied by the first generations of 
such kind of guided-democracy in which the authority 
of people does not against the sovereignty of Allah. 
26 Kompas, 22 Januari 2002.  
27 Mudzakir’s conviction the necessity of the unity 
of ummah is based on Muhammad’s famous tradition 
saying that “Muslims would split into 72 or 73 factions 
and all of them would go to the hell except one, i.e., 
“ahlu al-sunnah wa al-jama‘ah”. 
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Muslims, but they also should imitate their 
outlook and behaviour. Although the 
Gumuks’ salafy is different from other salafy 
in general in Indonesia, however, their 
appearance is much similar to salafy 
generally.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
In many respects, the jama‘ah Gumuk 
could be considered as radical Islamism. 
Internally, they studied Islam seriously 
especially on Quranic exegesis and the 
prophet’s traditions, so that they seemingly 
salafy-alike. Externally, however, they are 
involved in some action-oriented politics in 
many various forms. The vigilante forces of 
the FPIS and Hawariyyun are their means for 
their actions. In one way, as the people are 
studying Islam, they could be considered as 
pious salafy. However, since they are also 
involve in many politically oriented actions, 
they are also could be considered as political 
Islamism. Although sometimes they 
conducted their activities in violent ways, 
they could hardy be considered as radical 
violence as the JI for example. Eventually, 
the Gumuk could be regarded as radical 
Islamism. 
 Along with the Gumuk’s activities on 
learning Islam, it emerged on the politically-
oriented actions in the form of the FPIS and 
Hawariyyun. In fact, among some other 
vigilante forces in Solo, their existence and 
activities in Solo and Indonesia in general are 
very significant. In the Solo context, these 
vigilante forces especially in the earlier are 
the most leading organizations in many 
events. The take over of the FPIS by the 
Gumuk community, to some extent, has 
reformed ideological foundation of the 
organization. 
Similar to some other vigilante forces 
in Indonesia, the FPIS is also concern mostly 
with anti-ma‘siyah (anti-immorality) actions. 
Fully aware that it is not an Islamic state, this 
organization does not demand for the 
implementation of sharī‘ah. Rather, it only 
demands to reinforce the existing regulations 
concerning to moral issues. For this reason, 
therefore, the FPIS demands some immoral 
places such as prostitutions, gambling 
centres, cafes, and hotels which it regards as 
violating of God’s law (ma‘siyah), especially 
during the Ramadhan (fasting month). In 
order to respect Muslims in performing their 
fast, the FPIS also demands restaurants to be 
closed during the daylight or at least not to 
expose their activities. Along with the above 
activities, the FPIS also attends the 
authorities in Solo region to impose the 
existing regulations. In this respects, the FPIS 
also offers its vigilante forces to cooperate 
with the authorities to do so. The most 
interesting thing in addition to the above 
actions is that the FPIS, along with some 
other vigilante forces, also conduct 
“sweeping” foreigners especially Americans 
living in hotels in Solo. This action was 
conducted as its concern and sympathy to the 
US’ attitude toward some Middle Easter 
Muslim counties, especially the invasion of 
US to Iraq. Although the FPIS did not force 
the foreigners to leave the hotels, this activity 
somehow has frightened the foreigners to 
stay in the city. On this issue, Warsito argue 
that the activities is not to frightened 
foreigners in the city, but to let them know 
that some Indonesian Muslims are objected 
to what the US have done to their 
counterparts in the Middle East.  
The most courageous attitude of the 
FPIS was to dismiss the flock and violence 
attitudes of thousand devout followers of the 
PDI in the main streets in Solo after the lost 
of Megawati at the general election in 2004. 
The police forces and any other Islamic 
vigilante forces could do nothing in this 
occurrence until the about 300 people of the 
FPIS and Hawariyyūn valiantly dismissed the 
flocks by reciting Allahu Akbar (Allah the 
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great) while holding swords in their hands.28 
The powerful actions of the FPIS in Solo 
gained much support and empathy from 
Muslims in Solo. 
Under the leadership of Warsito 
Adnan (2000-2005), the FPIS has become a 
leading Islamic activism in Solo and also well 
known at the national level. Under the 
successor of Warsito, Umar Kasim (2005-
2010), the FPIS is not quite significant 
phenomena especially in dealing with 
politics. It could be noted, that although the 
FPIS is still involved in some actions in Solo, 
its appearance is not as leading as it used to. 
The significant changes of the political 
attitudes of the FPIS on both local and 
national level reflected the changes of the 
mainstream within the Gumuks. The 
successful of the FPIS under the leadership of 
Warsito could not be separated from the 
broad network of Gumuk which is across the 
ex-residency of Surakarta. 
Slightly different from other vigilante 
forces, the FPIS as well as the Hawariyyūn 
could be considered as non-violent radical. 
Although in many cases the both were 
involved in several slightly radical violence, 
in general they do not tend to do violence. On 
the several semi ‘paramilitary” trainings held 
by the FPIS, Warsito argues that it were only 
regular exercise for the FPIS members and 
not as paramilitary trainings as accused by 
the authorities. On the symbol of swords in 
the flag of the FPIS, Warsito argues that the 
FPIS does not bring swords in several of their 
activities, except for the several activities 
they have to do so. Similarly, he also denied 
that the FPIS was violent when it conducted 
‘sweeping’ Westerners in hotels in Solo. 
Further, he adds that there are possibilities 
that other people conducted that ‘sweeping’ 
in violent ways in the name of the FPIS. That 
is among the reason that Hawariyyūn 
members should wear the uniform of 
Hawariyyūn especially during certain 
                                                 
28 Interview with Cholid Hasan in Solo on 11 
August 2006; Interview with Ali Usman, a Muslim 
figure, in Solo, on 13 September 2006. 
activities. On several occasions, the FPIS and 
Hawariyyūn proved that they tend to protect 
of the crowd from doing any harmful things. 
Records showed that the Hawariyyūn 
protected some national heritage buildings 
when riots were happened in Solo. This 
attitude is in line with their belief that such 
radical violence will not give any advantages 
for Islam. Rather, it will deteriorate the image 
of Islam. 
 Eventually, the FPIS and Hawariyyūn 
or the Gumuks in general believe that non-
violent actions would be much more fruitful 
for Islam. Therefore, these organizations 
were engaged in some other different 
activities such as peace demonstrations, 
attending the police headquarters, or mass 
media offices to demand or protest certain 
things related to their necessities. Another 
form of non-violent action of the FPIS is 
issuing press release of the concern of the 
organization toward a certain event regarding 
to Muslims. In their view, non-violent actions 
will attract more sympathy from people to 
Islam, even from non-Muslims. On the 
escalating radical violence in Indonesia, 
Warsito argues that it is mostly as the 
resistance of Indonesian Muslims to the 
deprivations and pressures of the government 
which was also influence by US.29 The more 
the government suppresses Muslims, the 
more militant they would be. 
Correspondingly, Mudzakir also argues that 
they act defensively along with the great 
agenda of the West to decrease the revivalism 
of Islam in Muslim world by the issuance of 
the discourse of terrorism. On the attitude of 
the JI in Bali, Mudzakir asserts that it could 
not be considered as the general phenomenon 
of Indonesian Muslims. The tough 
relationship between the state and Muslims 
during the New Order also played a 
significant role in the current escalating of 
Islamism.30  
29 Interview with Warsito Adnan in Solo on 20 
September 2006. 
30 Interview with Mudzakir in Solo on 17 
November 2006. 
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Based on the above information, the 
FPIS or the Gumuk in general could hardly 
be considered as radical violence or even 
jihādi Islamism. Indeed they are involved in 
many political-oriented actions, but the way 
how they conduct it is far much more 
different from those done by their 
counterparts, the FPI of Habieb Rizieq. 
Rather, they more concern to study Islam 
from the basic in order to re-Islamize 
common people in Solo who they considered 
as not having enough knowledge on Islam. 
They do want to implement sharī‘ah into 
Muslims’ daily life, but they do not employ 
any violent actions to do so. Therefore, they 
just could be considered as radical Islamism.  
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